Conclusion 4. You knew that the butler did it, but it was not true that the butler did it. However, even though people sometimes say things such as 4 , it is clear that Even though we cannot explain all knowledge in terms of propositional these things are not literally true. You did not know all along that the butler knowledge, propositional knowledge does have a special status.
We can explain did it. What was true all along was that you felt sure that the butler did it, or several other kinds of knowledge in terms of it. Furthermore, many of the most something like that. But 4 is not true, and it does not show that tional knowledge. It will be the focus of this book. And the point of this section there can be knowledge without truth. A second condition for knowledge is belief. If you know something, then It is propositional knowledge, or knowledge of facts.
If you do not even think that something is true, then you do not know it. Believing thus includes hesitant II. A good way to think about this is to notice that when you consider a statement, you can adopt any of three What does it take to know a fact? What is propositional knowledge? These are attitudes toward it: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment.
As an analogy, the questions raised by O l in Chapter 1. If you do not even think that not know that Thomas Jefferson was the first president of the United States.
The a statement is true, then you do not know that it is true. There is, however, an reason that you cannot know this is that he was not the first president. When the game is finally played, your hunch you do not believe it. To see this, consider the following example: turns out to have been correct. So you. Example 2. Bit I. You just had a guess that turned out. Some will say that the fact the belief in Example 2. But we can easily eliminate that feature without undermining the In saying 5 , John seems to be saying that this is a case of knowledge and not point.
Suppose you do not watch the game, but instead go to a long movie. The suggestion is that if it is belief, then it is not knowledge. If When you get out of the movie, you know that the game is over. You now have he is right, then belief is not a condition for knowledge. And you are right. You still do However, again, this appearance is misleading. John surely does accept the not know that they won. You are still right as a result of a lucky guess. When he says 5 , his point is that he does not merely believe The objections to TB are not limited to cases of lucky guesses.
And sort of example will illustrate the heart of the problem with TB. If your Example 2. Suppose that you are extremely tired, having worked You are a pessimist, and on the basis of this report you believe confidently that very hard for a long time. Someone asks if you are tired. You might respond by it will rain. And then it does rain. So you had a true belief that it would rain.
When 6. The reason you did not know in this case is not that you were guessing. Taken literally, what you say is false. You are tired. The point of your utterance Your belief is based on some evidence—the weather report—so it is not simply is to emphasize that you are not merely tired; you are exhausted.
The same thing a guess. But this basis is not good enough for knowledge. What you need for goes on in 5. By saying 5 , John is not really saying that he does not believe knowledge is something along the lines of very good reasons or a more reliable the statement. Philosophers often say that what is needed for knowledge, in addition to true We have now found two conditions for knowledge: To know something, you belief, is justification for the belief. We will spend a good deal of time later in this book examining this idea.
But for now it will suffice to notice that in the examples B. In contrast, in the counterexamples to TB , you did not have The ideas just presented may suggest that knowledge is true belief; that is, very good reasons and you could easily have been wrong. What is missing, then, in the counterexamples to TB and is present in the examples of knowledge we TB. This leads us to The. Traditional Analysis ofKnowledge. A little reflection should make it clear that TB is mistaken. There are lots of times that a person has a true belief but does not have knowledge.
Here is a III. The experts are TAK.. You have a believing p. Something along these lines can be found in various sources, perhaps going he would express his belief using a French equivalent of this sentence.
Thus, For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but 8. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. And One way to understand these matters is as follows. So 7 can be true because Pierre believes the relevant proposition about phers. Truth A. Belief The second element of the TAK is truth.
People say many complicated and To believe something is to accept it as true. When you consider any statement, murky things about truth, but the fundamental idea is very simple. The issue you are faced with a set of alternatives: You can believe it, you can disbelieve it, here is not about which things are in fact true.
Rather, the question for now is or you can suspend judgment about it. Recall that we are taking belief to include about what it is for something to be true. At any given time, if you consider a proposition, you will end ing principle: up adopting one of these three attitudes. A proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts iff thing as believing the negation or denial of that proposition. So disbelieving the world is the way the proposition says it is.
A proposition is false that George Washington was the first president is the same as believing that it iff it fails to correspond to the facts. Suspending judgment about the proposition is to neither believe it nor disbelieve it. It applies to our example about George One additional point about belief deserves mention here. Suppose a French Washington in the following way.
The proposition that George Washington was child is taught that George Washington was the first president of the United the first president is true just in case it corresponds to the facts as they actually States.
Thus, it becomes true that are. The proposition is false if he was not the first president. This should come 7. Pierre believes that George Washington was the first president of the as no surprise. The principle applies in analogous ways to other propositions.
United States. It will be helpful to spell out a few consequences of CT and to mention a few things that are not consequences of CT. The noteworthy thing here is that 7 can be true even if Pierre does not speak a word of English.
Washington have no bearing on the truth value i. The actual facts of the case determine its truth value. It is not snowing. In fact, this is about the truth value of the proposition that it is snowing?
Is it true or is it false? Some people dismiss without consideration 9a. It is snowing here in Maine. However, if we disagree about something, then, trivially, I think that I am right Similarly, the person in Florida who says 10 says something that is most clearly and that you are wrong.
If, for example, you think that Thomas Jefferson was the displayed in first president and I think that it was George Washington instead, then I think that you are wrong about this and you think that I am wrong about this.
It would 10a. It is not snowing here in Florida. But when you disagree with me, I do think you are wrong. If you are We may assume both of these propositions are true. Their truth is objective, in not dogmatic, you recognize your own fallibility. You are open to changing your that it depends upon the weather conditions in the two places. There are circumstances in which it might 6 There are puzzles about sentences such as be rude to tell others that you think they are wrong.
And possibly die mere fact that others disagree provides you with some reason to reconsider your views. Yogurt tastes good. But, it seems, it used to be true. What does CT say about this? If a person would get into technicalities that are not important for present purposes.
The proposition it expressed back in is true. The proposition it expresses It is not obvious that 11 says something about individual preferences.
We can say that the sentence can be used to express a means, then it does not express different propositions when said by different series of propositions about specific times. It expresses one proposition about majority tastes, and that proposition ing that a certain thing has a certain property at one time as a predecessor of is true if most people like yogurt and not true if they do not.
This assumes one dated proposition is true and its successor proposition is false. On this view, 11 could be true even if problem for CT here, provided we are careful about the propositions in hardly anyone actually likes the taste of yogurt.
You might find this view strange; question. The person tion of 11 is right, there is no trouble for CT. The proposition expressed in Maine says:9 by 11 will vary from one speaker to another if the first option is right, but not in the other cases.
It is snowing. There simply are not exact boundaries to the heights to of the majority of people, or the objective facts about good taste. That complicated matter can be left to those who study Vagueness causes numerous problems in understanding exactly how language aesthetics. As just noted, vagueness is a feature of sentences. Because this world is external to us, we can never really know 12 , it seems, is vague. If that proposition is vague, pends upon our own views about the world. Absolute truth must always be beyond or indefinite in truth value, then CT needs revision.
CT says that every our grasp. Much of epistemology sitions that partially correspond to the way the world is. One might say that is an effort to respond to it. For now it is enough to note two points. One might even say that there is a whole range of truth values, ists independent of us, it does not follow that we cannot know what that world that truth comes in degrees.
These are complex matters that cannot easily be is like. Thus, if there is any strong argument for skepticism, it relies on a premise resolved. We will not attempt to resolve them here. It is enough to realize that beyond anything stated in the preceding paragraph. We will consider how such CT may require modification in order to deal with vagueness. Second, throughout the next several chapters we will assume, as The Standard C.
Justification View does, that we do know things. This is not a matter of prejudging the issues associated with skepticism. The Skeptical View will get a fair hearing in nality or reasonableness will be the focus of a large part of this book. Consider again Example 2. Consider a sentence such as rain on the day of your picnic on the basis of a forecast saying that the odds of its raining were slightly greater than half.
Michael is tall. It is not as if you simply made it up, with no reason at all. But your reasons were far from good enough to give you knowledge. So what clause Suppose that someone asserts 12 in a normal conversational context such as iii of the TAK requires is very strongjustification. In the circumstances described, the following: You are about to pick up Michael at the airport.
You know that you do not have it for the belief that it will rain. If the day of the picnic comes and he is an adult male, but you do not know what he looks like. Under those circumstances you would satisfy tually 6'4", then 12 expresses a truth.
If Michael is 4'10", then 12 says clause iii of the TAK. If Michael is about 5T0", then it is difficult to say whether 12 tion, or adequate justification. This may be a bit imprecise, but it will do for now. That height seems to be a borderline case of You can be justified in believing something without actually believing it.
Clause iii of the TAK does not imply i. The problem we have in the final situation, when Michael is 5T0", is not that we do not know enough about the situation. Insecure has just taken an exam. The teacher quickly looked over his heights for adult men, and anything else that is relevant. Insecure has studied hard, taken and done well on the widely regarded as items of knowledge.
This can be distressing to those out of practice exams, found the questions on the actual exam similar to the ones power, especially when they have better justification for competing views. He has excellent reasons to think that he passed ever, questions about what determines what gets counted as knowledge, and the exam.
But Mr. Insecure is insecure. He never believes that he has done how the powerful manage to impose their views on others, are noL the focus of well and does not believe that he has done well on this exam. Our topic is real knowledge, not apparent knowledge. Even though Mr. Insecure does not believe that he has passed the exam, he is V. So condition iii of the TAK is satisfied, but condition i is not. To be justified in believing a proposition is, Q'l from Chapter 1 asked what it took to have knowledge.
This analysis has a What is justified for one person may not be justified for another. You have long history. It seems to fit very well with The Standard View. The examples of many justified beliefs about your private life. And what isjus- lief. And cases in which we lack knowledge seem to be cases in which we lack tified for an individual changes over time. A modification of Example 2. A week before the picnic, you may not have had justification for There is, however, a significant objection to the TAK.
We turn next to it. In many 1. The following examples show general patterns of various kinds of statements, with cases we can explain why a belief is justified; we can formulate our reasons. The patterns make use However, there arc exceptions to this. For example, a child might have many of variables that can be replaced by specific terms.
The A1 of this chapter. To take some 3. It is important to understand the difference between 2 and simple examples, perhaps people in ancient times would have said that among 2a. The librarian knows either that there is a book by Salinger in the library or that the things they know is the fact that the earth is flat.
Perhaps they would have there is not a book by Salinger in the library. But the librarian must possess special knowledge if times that they did have knowledge in these cases. The methodology used here will be important in what follows. One important test fact. We might say that they had apparent knowledge. Nevertheless, they lacked of a proposed definition is that there are no counterexamples to it.
The earth is not, and never was, 7. From Meno, translated by G. Reprinted in Plato: Complete Works, edited flat. It is not, and never was, at the center of the universe. They thought. A similar idea is presented in another dialogue, Theatetus, translated by M.
Levett, even with justification , that they had knowledge, but they were mistaken. Reprinted in Plato: Complete Works. See p. Another point deserves mention here. It may be that the claims of those 9. There is an alternative way to think about these matters. Instead of saying that there are three options, you can say that you can believe a proposition to a greater or lesser degree. You can think of these degrees of belief as arranged along a scale.
When you accept a proposition with absolute conviction, you believe it to tire fullest degree. When you completely and totally reject a proposition, you have the lowest possible degree of belief in it. And in the usual cases, your degree of belief falls somewhere in between. Suspension ofjudgment is right in the middle. Traditional There are hard questions about exactly what kinds of objects propositions are.
We can safely ignore those questions here. This topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9. At this point you might observe that we might be in a situation like the ancients, in which our claims to knowledge are mistaken. We will take up this issue when we consider The Skeptical View. It is possible that some of the attractiveness of The Relativistic View, mentioned in Chapter 1, results from confusing apparent knowledge and real knowledge.
This analysis is correctjust in case in all possible examples, if a person knows some proposition, then the person has ajustifiecl true belief in that proposition, and if a person has a justified true belief, then the person has knowledge.
The first philosopher to argue explicitly against the TAK in the manner to be discussed here was Edmund Gettier. Other philosophers have described additional cases establishing the same point. The first example is a modified version of one Gettier originally presented. Example 3. Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. The son asks if there are any sheep in the field they are passing. On the basis of 1 , Smith correctly deduces and believes another proposition: 6.
There is a sheep in the field. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Smith is justified by what he sees in thinking that 5 is true, 6 follows from 5 , so he is justified in believing 6 as well.
Smith is justified in believing 2 on the basis of this inference. In spite of As it turns out, 5 is false. The boss misspoke when he said statue, or some other perfect sheep look-alike. But 6 , as it happens, is thatjones was going to get the job.
Out in the field, but out of view, there is a sheep. So, Smith has ajustified belief in 6 , and it is true. But he does not know it. It is only by luck that he is right about 6. In this example 2 is true even though 1 is false. For was also justified in believing 2.
And 2 is true. But clearly Smith does not know 2. It is just a coincidence owns a Ford. Nogot can show him his keys with a Ford insignia and wear a Ford that he is right about 2. No matter how much you add to the case, it will remain possible that Nogot is faking his Ford ownership. And given that this is possible, it remains Example 3. Similar remarks apply to the other examples. Not only by written or printed but can you enjoy this book through e-book.
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Evidentialism is a theory of knowledge whose essence is the traditional idea that the justification of factual knowledge is entirely a matter of evidence. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman present the definitive exposition and defence of this much-contested theory. They argue that evidentialism is an asset virtually everywhere in epistemology, from getting started legitimately to refuting skepticism.
Used Book in Good Condition Review "In Evidentialism, Conee and Feldman admirably and effectively defend a traditional epistemological view they call evidentialism from its externalist critics.
These tended to be quite short. I had hoped that they might have more to say in response to Timothy Williamson's work, but they dedicate about a page to explaining why they thought their view survived largely intact in spite of what seemed to others to be serious criticisms of their views. I was also disappointed by how brief their discussion of pragmatic encroachment was. They dedicate about a page to Fantl and McGrath's criticism of evidentialism and say, basically, that they are not committed one way or another to any of the claims that Fantl and McGrath discuss.
Even if this is so, it would have been nice if shared some of their thoughts on pragmatic encroachment. Sophisticated yet accessible approach. Makes difficult concepts clear without oversimplifying them. Discussion of relativism and the possibility of rational disagreement. Introduces students to an important topic of dispute in epistemological studies. Table of Contents I. Epistemological Questions.
Evidentialist Theories of Knowledge and Justification. Nonevidentialist Theories of Knowledge and Justification.
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